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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Libya is a North African state well known for its advanced economy and oil industry. Having gained its 
independence from Italy in 1951,1 Libya quickly became a country of interest to Western nations due to 
the oil reserves discovered in 1955.2 The discovery of the oil reserves led to seven of the biggest global 
oil companies establishing wells in Libya, initially dominating the oil industry in the country. Despite that, 
King Idris al-Sanusi who was the Head of State at the time established the Libyan National Oil Company 
in 1963 and effectively regained control of the industry.3  
With the largest oil reserves on the continent, Libya became the richest state in North Africa. In 2010, it 
was the state that had the highest GDP per capita in Africa of US$ 29. 1733 PPP.4  As the oil industry 
grew, Libya experienced a high influx of migrant workers who sought after better economic 
circumstances. An estimate of 1.8 million migrant workers relocated to Libya in the years of its economic 
boom.5 Not only was the economy doing well, but Libya’s crime rate was also low with only three 
homicides per 100 000 people.6  
Nonetheless, due to political instability in 2011, the economy of Libya took a downward trajectory. 
Libya’s annual production of 3 million barrels of oil reduced to less than 1 million.7 The crime rate in 
Libya significantly increased as a result of violent militia activity and an increase of arms in the state. The 
state experienced political unrest through protests and this led to a rise in human rights violations primarily 
linked to human trafficking, migrant smuggling and slave trade.8  
                                                 
1 Ana Baldinetti ‘Libya’ in Suad Joseph (ed) Arab Family Studies (2018) 57 – 78 at 57.  
2 Enrica Oliveri Matricola Libya Before and After Gaddafi: An International Law Analysis (unpublished PhD thesis, Università 
Ca'Foscari Venezia, 2012) at 4. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran ‘The Libyan Economy after the Revolution: Still No Clear Vision’ Atlantic Council: Rafik 
Hariri Centre for the Middle East (2014) 
5 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Libya Crisis: IOM’s Health and Psychosocial Responses for Migrants, 
available at https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/health/crisis/Libya-Crisis-Infosheet-EN.pdf 
accessed on 21 February 2019 at 5. 
6 European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control Affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI) and United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International Statistics on Crime and Justice, 2010, No. 64 at 11.  
7 International Monetary Fund Public Information Notice: IMF Executive Board Concludes the 2013 Article IV Consultation 
with Libya, May 23 2013, PIN No 13/60 available at https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/pn1360 accessed 
on 19 February 2019.  
8 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), United Nations Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), Desperate 
and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya 18 December 2018. 
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It has been well documented by various regional and international human rights bodies, including the 
United Nations (UN), UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), that a significant portion of immigrants in Libya are victims of human trafficking, 
extortion through smuggling in persons and slavery.9In the UNSMIL 2012 report, it was reported that the 
lack of legal recourse for migrants left them vulnerable to arrest, arbitrary detention, deportation and 
exploitation.10 In 2015, the same annual report by UNSMIL reflected that the situation for migrants 
continued to worsen through abusive detention conditions.11 
Despite consistent reports revealing the immigrant abuse situation in Libya, there has been a slow response 
in addressing these human rights violations by relevant international organisations. The concerned 
organizations include the UN, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the Libyan 
government itself. Most parties have maintained a complacent attitude towards these abuses and in certain 
instances, have caused matters to escalate. 
This thesis submits that the aforementioned international and regional bodies and the Libyan government 
have failed their duty, under international law, to prevent the escalation of the slave trade in Libya. Further, 
the thesis concludes that the Libyan government is accountable in terms of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine and that all bodies are liable in terms of other relevant international and regional instruments. To 
support this submission, the paper will study the history of the slave trade in Libya as well as discuss the 
prevalence and forms of slavery in the country. Additionally, the paper will examine the international law 
provisions that govern this particular issue, the duty of states, regional and international bodies under 
international law, and the adequacy, or lack thereof, of any reactions of the duty bearing bodies, including 
the state of Libya.  
                                                 
9 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends 2011: A Year of Crises, 18 June 2012, IOM, IOM Learns of 'Slave Market' Conditions 
Endangering Migrants in North Africa, 11 April 2017, accessed on 6 February 2019 available at 
https://www.iom.int/news/iom-learns-slave-market-conditions-endangering-migrants-north-africa, UN News Service, 
Security Council condemns reported slave trade of migrants in Libya, 7 December 2017, available at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13105.doc.htm accessed on 9 January 2019. 
10 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 
30 August 2012, S/2012/675 at 61. 
11 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 26 February 2015, S/2015/144 at 
49. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
i. Libya’s Rise to Unrest 
The first government after independence was a monarchy under the rule of King Idris al-Sanusi. King 
Idris focused on eradicating Italian customs and reintroducing Libya’s culture.12 Unfortunately, this 
conversion delayed progression in education in the state and illiteracy levels were high. Over the next few 
years, the monarchy worked to improve these issues in Libya but the country’s economy was still in its 
developmental stages.13 In 1955, the UN discovered oil reserves14 which led to Libya’s economic boom. 
In 1969, there was a military coup d’etat led by Colonel Gaddafi, who overthrew the monarchy and 
became the Head of State.15 Libya had transitioned from a being a colony to a monarchy and then a 
dictatorship under Gaddafi’s rule. Although Gaddafi’s regime was authoritarian, he remained focused on 
strengthening the education sector and the economy of the state.16 
One of the main causes of the instability of Libya’s economy is the civil uprising that took place during 
the Arab Spring in 2011. The Arab Spring was an uprising movement that commenced in Tunisia and 
spread across North Africa and the Middle East. Many of these movements involved civilian protests 
against their current governments.17 The Libyan people protested against the dictatorship rule of Gaddafi 
in January of 2011.18 By February, different protesting groups had joined forces as the opposition and 
formed the Libyan National Council. Various Western states including France, Italy and Spain supported 
the opposition.19  
The overthrowing of Gaddafi as head of state created a gap in the leadership of the state, which led to 
political instability.20 Moreover, rebel groups gained more power and territory within Libya.21 The actions 
of the opposition soon turned violent. The opposition received arms through Egypt, a move which was 
                                                 
12 Ana Baldinetti ‘Libya’ in Suad Joseph (ed) Arab Family Studies (2018) at 58. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Enrica Oliveri Matricola Libya Before and After Gaddafi: An International Law Analysis (unpublished PhD thesis, Università 
Ca'Foscari Venezia, 2012) at 3.  
15 Ana Baldinetti ‘Libya’ in Suad Joseph (ed) Arab Family Studies (2018) at 58.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Farhad Khosrokhavar ‘The Arab Revolutions and Self-Immolation’ (2012) Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines 169 at 174. 
18 Elvin Aghayev ‘Analysis and Background of the “Arab Spring” in Libya’ (2013) Vol 39 No. 1-2 European Researcher 193 
at 194.  
19 Ibid at 195.  
20 Tom Eaton ‘Libya’s War Economy Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness’ (2018) Middle East North Africa Programme 
at 2.  
21 Ibid. 
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supported by the United States of America (USA).22 As events unfolded, there were various reports of the 
opposition using these weapons on civilians.23  Due to the escalating violence and the heavy civilian 
casualties in Libya, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution for international intervention in 
Libya.24 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led the intervention into Libya in line with the 
UNSC resolution and NATO forces entered Libya in March 2011.25 Gaddafi was injured by NATO attacks 
but was eventually caught and executed by the opposition.26 These contributing factors left Libya in a 
chaotic state as there was no legitimate government and clear leadership following his assassination.  
These events exposed the state to several problems such an increase in human rights violations, primarily 
linked to human trafficking of migrants across the border en route to Europe,27 and the slave trade. Prior 
to the uprising, many migrants relocated to Libya to better their economic circumstances and work in the 
oil industry. These migrants were ‘migrant workers’ who had a different status from migrants that were 
fleeing conflict. According to the IOM, Libya had an estimated 2.5 million migrants before the crisis,28 
this is including the 1.8 million migrant workers.29 Only 700 000 of those migrants were non-working 
migrants who were not in Libya for work, but rather as asylum seekers. The IOM estimated that the 
number of migrant workers who fled Libya in 2011 following the violence at 790 000.30 In 2018, the IOM 
estimated 700 000 to 1 million non-working migrants to be in Libya.31 The Libyan sovereign border was 
already difficult to control before the uprising because of the vast desert, however, the lack of political 
control crippled it further and paved way for a bigger market for migrant smuggling into Libya en route 
to Europe.32 
 
                                                 
22 Elvin Aghayev ‘Analysis and Background of the “Arab Spring” in Libya’ (2013) Vol 39 No. 1-2 European Researcher at 
195. 
23 Ibid at 196.  
24 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya], 17 March 
2011, S/RES/1973(2011). 
25 Elvin Aghayev ‘Analysis and Background of the “Arab Spring” in Libya’ (2013) European Researcher at 196. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid at 10.  
28 IOM, Libya Crisis: IOM’s Health and Psychosocial Responses for Migrants, available at 
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/health/crisis/Libya-Crisis-Infosheet-EN.pdf accessed on 
21 February 2019 at 1. 
29 IOM, Migrants Caught in Crisis: The IOM Experience in Libya, 2012, at 5. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Libya’s Migrant Report, Round 21 July – August 2018 (2018) 3. 
32 Ibid.  
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ii. Slave Trade 
Slavery is not a new phenomenon. It has existed throughout history for centuries with the earliest record 
of slave trade taking place in Egypt, as early as 15 BC. Egypt at the time engaged in the practice of 
enslaving non-Africans such as Arabs and Palestinians.33  However, the general practice was for Africans 
to enslave one another.34 The practice of slavery can be traced to civil unrest and conflict between various 
ethnic groups on the African continent. Many slaves were used for various purposes, the women, for 
instance, were used for domestic work whilst the men carried out work outdoors, or were exploited as 
soldiers.35 The status of slaves differed from region to region, where some were seen as property for their 
entire lives and others could eventually gain the status of a relative of the family they were attached to.36  
Although the initial activities in slave trade involved Africans enslaving fellow Africans, the dynamics 
shifted in the 7th Century. Foreign parties such as the Europeans and the Arab Muslims began to engage 
in the trade of African slaves. At this point, these slaves were being sold in Africa and shipped to Europe 
and other states to serve as slaves.37  This resulted in a high demand for slaves, which in turn created a 
dangerous environment for Africans. During the 15th to the 19th Centuries, 12 million slaves were traded 
across the Atlantic Ocean. Slave traders shipped slaves in inhumane conditions with little or no food and 
kept them in cramped spaces. Slaves in Africa were exploited to work on the production of goods and 
food for Africans. However, the Europeans and the Arabs utilised slavery to develop their communities, 
which deteriorated the way in which slaves were treated over the years as the demand for slaves grew.38  
In the mid-1800s, the United States, France and Britain outlawed slavery. By the 1930s, slavery in Africa 
was almost abolished. As a result, the slave trade drastically dropped. Be that as it may, this was not the 
end of slavery, as illegal slave trade still exists today.39  
Slavery in the 21st Century has become more advanced and less detectable. Migrant smuggling has 
transformed into a form of human trafficking in Libya. This has become a major concern, especially in 
Europe, which is struggling with a significant number of migrants trying to penetrate its borders by the 
                                                 
33 DTM, Libya’s Migrant Report, Round 21 July – August 2018 (2018) 3 
34 Donald R. Wright ‘Slavery in Africa’ Online Encyclopaedia, accessed on 14 November 2018 available at 
http://autocww.colorado.edu/~toldy2/E64ContentFiles/AfricanHistory/SlaveryInAfrica.html. 
35 In some regions such as in West and Central Africa, many were used as soldiers. 
36 Donald R. Wright ‘Slavery in Africa’ Online Encyclopaedia. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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sea.40  The Migrant Crisis caused panic in Europe, some states increasing their bans on migrants and others 
limiting their migrant intake. For instance, in 2017 Germany decided to limit its annual intake of asylum 
seekers to 200 000.41 As a result, many migrants continue to remain in perpetual transit in Libya and their 
conditions in the country are atrocious.  
Libya has become the main transit route for migrants on their way to Europe and as a result, Libya is also 
receiving a large influx of migrants. These migrants travel to Libya with the aim of being smuggled across 
the sea to Europe in the hope of securing greener pastures on the other side.42  Despite their intentions, in 
most cases, these migrants find themselves in a situation where they are detained unfairly, suffer abuse, 
malnutrition and sexual assault.43 In the worst situations, they find themselves sold as slaves.44  The slave 
trade in Libya was first publicly exposed in November of 2017 by a video clip broadcasted by CNN.45  
This has led to a massive public outcry by the international community. 
In Libya, the line between human trafficking and smuggling has become blurred.46 Two additional 
protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) have 
defined trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling.47 Smuggling in persons occurs when there is the 
‘procurement of illegal entry into a state where the person is neither a national nor resident, for the 
financial benefit of the smuggler’.48 Trafficking in persons involves the recruitment, transporting or 
transferring persons through coercion, abduction or other means of force, with the intention of exploiting 
such persons.49 Although both involve the acts of recruitment, movement and delivery of persons, what 
                                                 
40 Eugene Quinn ‘The Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Europe’s Challenge’ An Irish Quarterly Review Vol. 105 No. 419. 
41 Melissa Eddy ‘Germany’s Angela Merkel Agrees to Limits on Accepting Refugees’ The New York Times 9 October 2017 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/world/europe/germany-merkel-refugees.html accessed on 23 February 
2019.  
42 Alexandru Apetroe ‘The European migration crisis. Which consequences affecting the stability of the European Union?’ 
Research Gate (2016).  
43 Oxfam ‘You Aren’t Human Anymore’ Oxfam Media Briefing 9 August 2017 at 1.  
44 UNSMIL, OHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya 18 
December 2018. 
45 Nima Elbagir, Raja Razek, Alex Platt and Bryony Jones ‘People for sale: Where lives are auctioned for $400’ CNN 15 
November 2017 available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html accessed on 15 
November 2018. 
46 The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Responding to the Human Trafficking-Migrant Smuggling 
Nexus: With a focus in Libya, July 2018 at 1. 
47 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 8 January 2001, A/RES/55/25. 
48 Article 3(a) of the UN General Assembly, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000. 
49 Article 3(a) of the UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 
2000. 
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separates the two is the willingness of the smuggled or trafficked to participate. Although aware of the 
risks and dangers human smuggling will expose them to, migrants take these risks but many do not 
anticipate that they will become victims of trafficking in persons.50 
 
iii. Legal Instruments  
In December of 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
published a report entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’.51 It placed three main obligations on the 
international community, these were; the responsibility to protect, the responsibility to react and finally 
the responsibility to rebuild.52  The report put limitations on the use of military interventions and provided 
six requirements that need to be met before such action can be taken.53 It provided that this form of 
intervention would only be an option where there is ‘just cause, based on actual or anticipated mass 
suffering and evidence by large-scale loss of life’.54 This form of intervention may only be used to put an 
end to human suffering.55 The United Nations Security Council has the responsibility to intervene or 
authorise intervention in situations where international peace and security are threatened.56  
At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, global political leaders endorsed the new Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine as an instrument to ‘govern international political behaviour’.57 The doctrine provides a 
link between the sovereignty of a state and the protection of the human rights of its people. Should a state 
fail to carry out this responsibility, the onus then rests on the international community to assume a 
corresponding duty to protect the civilians from crimes against humanities, including the slave trade.58  
Slave trade has been defined by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
                                                 
50 The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Responding to the Human Trafficking-Migrant Smuggling 
Nexus: With a focus in Libya, July 2018 at 1. 
51 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001; see 
also Monica Serrano ‘The responsibility to protect and its critics: Explaining the consensus’ (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to 
Protect 425 at 437. 
52 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001at XI. 
53 Ibid at 32. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid; see also Monica Serrano ‘The responsibility to protect and its critics: Explaining the consensus’ (2011) 3 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 425 at 437. 
56 Ibid at 34. 
57 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 24 October 
2005, A/RES/60/1 at para 138 - 139. 
58 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001; United Nations approved the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
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Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. The 1956 Convention describes the slave 
trade to mean and include: 
The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of 
transport, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this 
Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties.59 
The definition of a crime against humanity has also been codified by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Rome Statute).60 According to the Rome Statute ‘enslavement’ is a crime against 
humanity, ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against [any civilian 
population]’.61  
Most States accept the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)62 as the cornerstone of 
international human rights. The UDHR broadly governs all international human rights matters. The AU, 
EU and the Libyan government have made references to the UDHR to address various human rights issues. 
Although not legally binding, some of its provisions have gained the status of jus cogens.  Jus Cogens, 
which translates to “compelling law”, refers to international laws that are superior.63  These laws are 
peremptory in nature and non-derogatory.64 The articles that address slavery,65 the right to life,66 torture67 
and prolonged imprisonment68 fall under jus cogens.  
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)69 imposes duties and obligations on all member 
states of the EU to protect and promote human rights, including rights of migrants. The EU has a duty to 
ensure member states abide by these provisions. 
                                                 
59 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (The 1956 Convention), 7 September 1956. 
60 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-
9227-227-6. 
61 Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.  
62 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
63 Kamrul Hossain ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the U.N. Charter’ Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law (2005) Vol 3 Issue 1 p72-98 at 73.  
64 Kamrul Hossain ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the U.N. Charter’ Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law (2005) at 73. 
65 Article 4 of UNGA, UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
66 Article 3 of UNGA, UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
67 Article 5 of UNGA, UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
68 Article 9 - 11 of UNGA, UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
69 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02. 
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The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Charter) 70 codifies the human rights duties 
and obligations of member states, including Libya. 
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This objective of this thesis is to investigate the accountability of the UN, EU, AU and the Libyan 
government in the perpetuation of the slave trade in Libya. As stated above, the research will examine the 
duties of these bodies, and the state of Libya, in accordance with relevant regional and international 
instruments and principles, including the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The following questions will 
be addressed: 
1. Did the AU, EU and UN have a duty to intervene in or prevent the human rights violations in terms 
of the applicable international standards? 
2. Can the Libya government, AU, EU and UN be held accountable?  
3. To what extent can the UN, EU, AU and the Libyan government be held accountable for the slave 
trade in Libya? 
4. What recommendations may be made to improve the situation in Libya? 
 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The dissertation will rely on the texts of legal documents. A variety of sources, which include both primary 
and secondary sources of data, will be referenced. The main sources of information will derive from 
relevant international law and national legislation.  
The secondary sources will include texts, published articles and most importantly, official reports by 
various international bodies. This research paper will refer to legal textbooks, dissertations and theses by 
academics and legal experts. There will be articles from various national and international legal journals 
as well as newspapers. Papers presented at conferences will also be referenced. Desktop research will also 
be a useful research medium, particularly for sourcing international newspapers or journals, as well as for 
any other information that might not be easily found in printed literature. 
                                                 
70 The Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), 27 June 
1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
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V. LIMITATIONS 
State sovereignty is a notion that has been entrenched in international law. In terms of this principle, the 
international community may not intervene with the internal affairs of another state. The principle of 
Responsibility to Protect permits the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of a state.  
Similar to the principle of state sovereignty, Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter71 prohibit the UN 
and member states from using force or intervening in affairs of another state.72 Only the UNSC has the 
authority to decide whether such intervention is necessary in order to maintain international peace and 
security.73 This decision must comply with the requirements provided for under Chapters VI to VII and 
XII of the Charter.74  
Although the UNSC has the authority to permit legal intervention in a sovereign state, the functioning of 
the UNSC may limit this authority. The research, however, will not address state sovereignty and neither 
will it discuss any procedural protocols for regional or international bodies in the application of laws. 
 
VI. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
This thesis will comprise of five chapters. Chapter one provides a background on the study, the questions 
that will be answered as well as research limitations.  
Chapter II will provide an overview of the national, regional and international laws that will be considered 
throughout the study. It will also delve into international norms that are applicable in order to determine 
if the relevant bodies have complied with them.  
Chapter III will focus on the Libyan government and the AU. It will examine the background of both 
parties’ involvement in the violations, and what actions have been taken by them. An analysis of their 
duties under international law and liability in the slave trade crisis will be undertaken.  
                                                 
71 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
72 UN Charter.  
73 Article 24 of the UN Charter.  
74 Article 24 of the UN Charter. 
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Chapter IV will follow the same approach as the previous chapter with a focus on the EU and the UN. It 
will also consider the extent of the EU and the UN’s responsibility towards the crisis in Libya. 
Chapter V will provide an overall conclusion of the findings of the responsibility of each body. The chapter 
will then provide relevant recommendations.  
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CHAPTER II – INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAWS AND NORMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although slavery had been practised from as early as 15BC, it was not until the 1900s that international 
provisions were adopted to abolish slavery and the slave trade.75 As stated in chapter one, the slavery crisis 
in Libya emerged a result of the exploitation of migrants travelling through Libya. Today, various 
international standards exist to address the issue of slavery and migration.  
To determine how the Libyan government, the AU, EU and the UN are accountable for crimes against 
humanity, this chapter will examine the international, regional and national conventions and norms that 
have been established to govern the subject of slavery. Furthermore, it will consider the international 
accountability mechanisms that have been established to determine the accountability of the Libyan 
Government, the AU, EU and the UN.  
Additionally, the chapter will analyse the evolution of slavery and slave trade, as well as outline the 
definition of slavery in accordance with current international standards. With regards to crimes against 
humanity, international tribunals that have set compelling precedents will be studied. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have set guidelines for the interpretation of the notion 
of crime against humanity. 
This chapter further addresses the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, which provides for state 
accountability and appropriate responses to states that are accountable for disregarding their duty.  
 
II. SLAVERY AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 
i. The definition of Slavery and the Slave Trade 
a. The 1926 Slavery Convention 
In 1920, following the atrocities of World War I (WWI), the League of Nations (The League) was 
established to ensure that global peace would be sustained by promoting friendly relations between states. 
The League was the first international body to draft and adopt conventions that solely governed the issue 
                                                 
75 Donald R. Wright ‘Slavery in Africa’ Online Encyclopaedia. 
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of contemporary slavery.76 Regardless of its challenges in peacekeeping, the League was successful in its 
impact on social, economic and humanitarian issues, including the area of slavery.77 
In 1922 the League adopted the Temporary Slavery Commission, and through this Commission, the first 
definition of slavery in an international agreement was developed.78 The Commission enacted the 1926 
Convention,79 which stipulated the definitions for ‘slavery’ and ‘slave trade’. It defined slavery as ‘…the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised.’80 It then defined ‘slave trade’ to include;  
…all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all 
acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by 
sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of 
trade or transport in slaves. 
Prior to the establishment of the Temporary Slavery Commission, the term ‘slavery’ had not been defined. 
The development of this definition was therefore, a notable achievement for the League. Most importantly, 
it provided the foundation for the definition used to describe a slave today, that is, someone who is under 
the complete control of another, essentially as his/her ‘property’.81  
Although the Temporary Slavery Commission provided the foundations of defining slavery, it failed to 
establish practical ways in which slavery could be determined in different sovereign states as well as any 
mechanisms that could be consulted to evaluate and pursue allegations of slavery.82 In addition, a universal 
code to abolish slavery at an international level did not exist.  
With the aim of addressing these issues, in the 1930s the League established Advisory Committees. 
However, the work of these Committees was limited as a result of confidentiality agreements signed by 
                                                 
76 Kevin Bales and Peter T Robbins ‘No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude: A critical analysis of international slavery 
conventions’ (2001) 2(2) Human Rights Review (HRR) 18 at 22. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 League of Nations (The League), Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (1926 Slavery Convention), 25 
September 1926, 60 LNTS 253, Registered No. 1414. 
80 Article 1(1) of LON, 1926 Slavery Convention, Registered No. 1414. 
81 Jessica Bell ‘Contemporary Slavery and International Law’ Human Rights and Human Welfare. 
82 Kevin Bales and Peter T Robbins ‘No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude: A critical analysis of international slavery 
conventions’ (2001) 2(2) HRR 22. 
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states which effectively restricted transparency of the League’s efforts. Consequently, the work that the 
League had set to accomplish suffered and by the start of World War II (WWII), these efforts halted.83  
b. The 1956 Slavery Convention 
In 1945, the UN was established as a successor to the League of Nations. The UN upheld similar aims and 
objectives to the League, that is, to protect and promote peace and security amongst states. Through the 
UDHR84 in 1948, the UN prohibited acts of slavery and states. The UDHR states that ‘No one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’85 As stated 
earlier, this is one of the Articles in the UDHR that has received the status of jus cogens. 
The UN established ad hoc committees to review the existing conventions that were drafted by the League. 
The ad hoc Committee of Experts on Slavery determined that the definition of ‘slavery’ provided by the 
1926 Convention was sufficient.86 Even so, the Committee deemed it necessary to expand on the issues 
addressed by the Convention and as a result, the Committee recommended a supplementary convention.87  
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery88 of 1956 (1956 Convention) succeeded the 1926 Convention and provided a broader 
spectrum on the issue of slavery. The UN did not have the authority to confront issues of contemporary 
slavery until the 1956 Slavery Convention came into effect.89  
The 1956 Convention broadened the definition of slavery provided for by the 1926 Convention. The 
definition now included ‘debt bondage, serfdom, the selling of women by their families for marriage, 
certain forms of abuse of women, and the buying and selling of children for labour or prostitution’.90 It 
defined ‘slave trade’ as follows:  
                                                 
83 Kevin Bales and Peter T Robbins ‘No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude: A critical analysis of international slavery 
conventions’ (2001) 2(2) HRR 22. 
84 UNGA, UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
85 Article 4 of UDHR. 
86 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Abolishing Slavery and it’s contemporary 
forms, 2002, at 5. 
87 Kevin Bales and Peter T Robbins ‘No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude: A critical analysis of international slavery 
conventions’ (2001) 2(2) HRR 23. 
88 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (The 1956 Convention), 7 September 1956. 
89 Jessica Bell ‘Contemporary Slavery and International Law’ Human Rights and Human Welfare. 
90 Article I of the 1956 Convention. 
Rachael Nyirongo   LLM Dissertation 2019 
17 
 
The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of 
transport, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this 
Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties. 
In the 1926 Convention, the document implied that the purpose of conveying the slaves would be to use 
them as slaves at the point of destination.91 This definition by the 1956 Convention is more suitably 
applicable to contemporary forms of slavery.  Contemporary slavery has branched out and is not limited 
to the idea of ownership, but includes broader forms of slavery including, forced labour and human 
trafficking. These definitions set out by the 1956 Convention are applicable to all member states of the 
UN, and this includes Libya. 
 
ii. The Definition of a Crime against Humanity 
Prior to its codification, the term ‘crime against humanity’ was first used in a joint declaration in 1915 
between the French, British and Russian governments to condemn the actions of the Turkish government 
against the Armenians.92 The declaration referred to ‘crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
civilization’.93 Thereafter, the term ‘crime against humanity’ again emerged during the Nuremberg Trials 
after World War II (WWII) and has since been codified by the Rome Statute in 2011.  
As the first prosecutions of crime against humanity were pursued in the Nuremberg trials after WWII. At 
the time, the definitions of ‘a slave’ and ‘slave trade’ were provided for by the 1926 Convention.94 The 
Nuremberg trials were a series of military trials in 1945-1946, facilitated by allied forces under 
international law, to prosecute major war criminals who committed atrocious crimes during WWII. To 
convene the trials, the allied forces established the International Military Tribunal (IMT), this tribunal was 
governed by the Charter to the IMT (IMT Charter).95 The IMT Charter defined crimes against humanity 
as: 
                                                 
91 Article 1(2) of the 1926 Convention. 
92 Department of State, France, Great Britain and Russia Joint Declaration, May 29 1915, available at https://www.armenian-
genocide.org/popup/affirmation_window.html?Affirmation=160 accessed on 27 February 2019.  
93 Ibid. 
94 League of Nations (LON), Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (1926 Slavery Convention), 25 September 
1926, 60 LNTS 253, Registered No. 1414. 
95 UN, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the 
major war criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’), 8 August 1945. 
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…murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of 
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the state where perpetrated.96 
The criminal jurisdiction of the Tribunal overruled domestic law. This was applicable to every suspect 
whose crime fell into the definition of a crime against humanity, irrespective of their nationality and 
whether their state recognised the act as a crime.97 The act in question must have been committed before 
or during the war, which limited the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, it’s clear that slavery was 
regarded as a crime against humanity even before the war.  
After the IMT Charter, the UN attempted to codify ‘crimes against humanity’ in international law, and 
they established the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1947. The Commission was tasked to 
promote the progressive development of international law and its codification.98 The ILC published a 
report based on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, both of which tried issues of crimes against humanity. 
The definition of a crime against humanity provided for by the ILC was similar to the one stipulated in 
the IMT Charter. However, instead of considering crimes committed ‘before or during the war’99 the ILC 
amended it to include crimes, ‘in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime.’100 In their 
report to the UNGA, the ILC submitted that the reason for the inclusion of ‘time of peace’ was to ensure 
that crimes committed before the war were not exempt from prosecution.101 The ILC continued to develop 
the definition and eventually, in 1996 they defined crimes against humanity as crimes, ‘when committed 
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigates or directed by a Government or by any 
organisation or group’.102 This definition was limited to the acts of groups and not individuals. Regardless 
of this, there continued to be uncertainty of the definition of crimes against humanity and its elements.103 
                                                 
96 Article 6(c) of the United Nations, London Agreement, 8 August 1945. 
97 Article 6(c) of the United Nations, London Agreement, 8 August 1945. 
98 Article 1 of the United Nations, Statute of the International Law Commission (ILC Statute), 1947. 
99 Article 6(c) of the United Nations, London Agreement, 8 August 1945. 
100 Principle VI (c) of the International Law Commission, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the 
Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950.  
101 The International Law Commission (ILC) ‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly’ (1950) 
Vol 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission para 120 – 124.   
102 Article 18 of 1966 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.  
103 M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 2 ed (1999) 193. 
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The definition of crimes against humanity continued to evolve over the years. In 1993 the ICTY amended 
the definition of the IMT Charter and limited it to crimes committed during armed conflict.104 However, 
in 1993 the ICTR expanded the definition. The tribunal required that the crime be a ‘systematic or 
widespread attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds’.105 This definition now covered crimes that were committed during the Rwanda Genocide, a 
massacre which was motivated by ethnic hatred.  
The current definition of crimes against humanity was developed by the ICC in the Rome Statute in 
1998.106 The Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as, ‘acts committed as a part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’.107 This 
definition is similar to that of the ICTR, except the ICC omitted the requirement that an act constitute an 
attack on ‘national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds’.108 Unlike the previous definitions, the 
definition by the Rome Statute does not focus on the actor of the crime or the time at which the crime was 
committed, but rather focuses on the act that is carried out. Furthermore, unlike previous conventions, the 
Rome Statute provides a definition for each of the acts that may constitute a crime against humanity.109  
The definition is divided into two parts, the general elements and then the specific crimes.110 Before it can 
be proved that a specific crime is committed, the requirements for the general elements must be met. These 
                                                 
104 Article 5 of the UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended 
on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993.  
105 Article 3 of the UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 
October 2006), 8 November 1994. 
106 As stated in Article 7(1) – (2) of the Rome Statute  
‘1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;’ 
 
‘2. (c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in 
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;’ 
107 Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  
108 Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute. 
109 Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute.  
110 M. C. Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1999) 202. 
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requirements stipulate that the crime must be an ‘attack’ that is ‘widespread or systematic’ that is ‘directed 
against any civilian population’ and there must be ‘knowledge of the attack’.111 
The most accepted definition of an ‘attack’ was determined by the ICTY. In the judgment of Kunarac, 
Kovac and Vukovic Case (Kunarac Case)112 the court held that an ‘attack’ could be described as ‘a course 
of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence’.113 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY then 
expanded this and held that armed conflict and an attack are two separate things, the attack itself may take 
place during the armed conflict. The appeals chamber further went on to refer to the Customary 
International Law position, that the attack may take place before, during and after the war.114 Therefore, 
an attack is a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence which take place before, 
during or after the war.  
Regarding the requirement that the attack must be widespread or systematic, the ICTR and ICTY have 
come to similar conclusions about its interpretation. Both tribunals agree that ‘widespread’ refers to the 
large scale of the attack and takes into account the number of victims that have been affected.115 As for 
‘systemic’, they refer to the organised nature of the armed attack.116 The ICTR further makes reference to 
‘the improbability of their random occurrence’.117 The act need not comply with both, it must either be 
widespread or systematic. The ICTY added that there must be a pattern to the acts and the parties would 
have considered the consequences of their actions as they were being carried out. The Tribunal also 
declared that it is only the attack itself that must be widespread or systematic. A single act or a number of 
acts can still constitute a crime against humanity, provided it is not isolated.118  
The attack must be ‘directed against any civilian population’. In Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko 
Simatović, the court held that this meant that the ‘civilian population were the primary objects of the 
attack’.119 In Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, the court stated that ‘any’ could include an attack against people 
                                                 
111 Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute. 
112 Case IT-96-23 & 23/1 (Kunarac Case), Trial Chamber Judgement, 22 February 2001. 
113 Kunarac Case, Trial Chamber Judgement, Para 415 
114 Kunarac Case, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Para 86. 
115 Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye and Innocent Sagahutu, Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, 
Appeals Chamber Judgement, 11 February 2014, para. 260; Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgement, 29 May 2013, Para 41.  
116 Ndindiliyimana Case, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 260; Prlić Case, Trial Chamber Judgement, Para 41. 
117 Ndindiliyimana Case, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 260. 
118 Prlić Case, Trial Chamber Judgement, Para 41 - 42. 
119 Case No. IT-03-69-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 30 May 2013, Para 964. 
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of the same nationality or different nationalities.120 In the case of In the Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, ICC defined a civilian population to be ‘groups distinguishable by nationality, ethnicity or other 
distinguishing features’.121 This broadens the scope of the civilian population to include the victim’s pre 
and post-war, as well as persons that might be involved in the armed conflict.  
Finally, the act committed must be connected to the attack on the civilian population. In the Kunarac 
Case, the court held that it is not necessary that act of the accused take place at the same time as the attack, 
but the attack must be connected to the attack and may not be an isolated act.122 The ICTY, in Prosecutor 
v. Milorad Krnojelac further stated that an act can still be a part of the ‘attack’ even if the crime is 
committed several months after or several kilometres away.123 
Therefore, in order to prove that ‘slavery’ and ‘slave trade’ in Libya are crimes against humanity, the acts 
must meet these general requirements. If established as crimes against humanity, the question of whom is 
liable for the crimes arises. Additionally, it is vital to determine with whom the duty to act lies under the 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect.  
The Rome statute codified a definition of a crime against humanity for the international community, and 
yet, as the treaty body of the ICC, its jurisdiction does not extend to the entire international community. 
The ICC only has jurisdiction over acts committed on the territory of a party state124 or if the crime was 
committed against the national of a party state.125  
Unfortunately, Libya is not a party state. This means meaning that in order for the ICC to have jurisdiction 
over the crimes committed against the migrants in Libya, the migrants would have to be nationals of party 
states. The top five migrant nationalities in Libya are nationals of Niger, Egypt, Chad, Sudan and Ghana.126 
Out of these, only Chad, Ghana and Niger are party states to the ICC. Therefore, the ICC would have 
jurisdiction only over crimes against humanity committed against migrants that come from those party 
states.  
 
                                                 
120 Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 7 May 1997, Para 619.  
121 Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, para 110. 
122 Kunarac Case, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Para 100. 
123 Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 15 March 2002, Para 55.  
124 Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. 
125 Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute. 
126 DTM, Libya’s Migrant Report, Round 21 July – August 2018 (2018) at 4. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL STANDARDS FOR SLAVERY AND 
SLAVE TRADE 
i. The United Nations  
The UN has adopted various treaties that impose duties on states to protect human rights and prevent 
violations. States that are a signatory to these treaties are accountable to treaty bodies.127 However, the 
enforcement of international law is a challenge even where a state violates its duty.  Where the states are 
unwilling to observe their duties under treaties, it is difficult to ensure repercussions for non-compliance.  
a. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) came into effect. It is one of 
the fundamental instruments of international human rights law.128 The ICCPR is vital not only in setting 
global standards for civil and political rights but, for the first time, it provided persons with entitlements 
that we now know to be human rights.129 
As a treaty, it has a binding effect on all state signatories, however, the domestication of the provisions at 
a national level depending on whether the state is a monist or dualist state. A monist state is where 
international law treaties are automatically incorporated into the domestic system, whilst in a dualist state, 
there is no such incorporation until it is done by a particular Act of legislation.130 The ICCPR prohibits 
slavery and the slave trade.131 It further prohibits the act of servitude, which has a broader scope than 
slavery,132 and includes ‘economic exploitation, dominance exercised by one person over another and 
slavery-like practices’.133 This provision is absolute and states may not implement national laws that limit 
this right.134 
                                                 
127 Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials 
and Commentary (2000).  
128 Linda Camp Keith ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make A Difference in 
Human Rights Behavior?’ (1999) Vol 36 No Journal of Peace Research 95 to 118 at 96. 
129 Vladislava Stoyanova ‘United Nations against Slavery: Unravelling Concepts, Institutions and Obligations’ (2017) Vol 38 
No 3 Michigan Journal of International Law (MJIL) at 360 to 361. 
130 John Laws ‘Monism or Dualism’ (2000) 53e Année, No. 2, Numero special 2 La Revue administrative p18-22 at 18. 
131 Article 8(1) of UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. 
132 Article 8(2) of the ICCPR 
133 S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (2000) 199. 
134 Ibid at 20. 
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The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is the UN body that supervises the implementation of the ICCPR 
by states.135 It monitors the states and also provides interpretations of provisions in the ICCPR.136 The 
HRC has adopted three main mechanisms to ensure that states are implementing the ICCPR.137 The HRC 
reviews state reports and responds to them; makes general comments on states’ interpretations of the 
ICCPR and hears claims of individuals against states. Individuals may make a claim against a particular 
state directly to the HRC provided that the state has ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.138 
However, the Optional Protocol requires that a claimant exhaust all national remedies before pursuing 
relief from the HRC.139 
Although the UN has established various monitoring mechanisms to ensure the non-existence of slavery, 
success in their monitoring largely relies on the cooperation of regional bodies and states. Indeed, the 
ICCPR ensured that the abolition slavery was no longer a matter of state choice. It bestowed upon 
individuals the absolute right to protection against acts of slavery. It requires states to take active steps in 
the abolition of slavery.140 Regrettably, the limitations of the ICCPR and the HRC are clear. A lack of 
resources, the significant dependence on state participation and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
restrict their substantive and monitoring impact. Moreover, as is the case with international law, the 
implementation of the ICCPR is primarily a domestic matter.141 
As a signatory to the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol, Libya has the duty to ensure that slavery does 
not exist in the country. This also means that all persons within its jurisdiction may bring a claim against 
Libya before the HRC, this includes migrants. However, migrants may face challenges in bringing forward 
such a claim particularly in satisfying the requirement of exhausting national judicial remedies. In a state 
where persons are held in slavery or servitude, it is challenging for these victims to gain access to fair 
national remedies.  
                                                 
135 Article 28 of the ICCPR. 
136 Article 40 of the ICCPR. 
137 Article 40 of the ICCPR. 
138 Article 1 of the UNGA, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (First Optional 
Protocol), 19 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.  
139 Article 2 of the ICCPR. 
140 Article 2(1) - (2) of the ICCPR. 
141 S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (2000) 9. 
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ii. The European Union 
By the end of WWII, Europe had suffered one of the biggest genocides in history, the Holocaust. As a 
result, Europe needed to take measures to reinstate and enforce the values of human rights.  
a. The European Convention on Human Rights  
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is an agreement between European states to protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. One of the main objectives behind the establishment 
of the ECHR was to prevent the repeat of human rights atrocities such as the German Holocaust.142 The 
European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) implements and interprets the provisions of the ECHR. The 
court's decisions have binding authority over member states.143 
The ECHR provides that no one should be held in slavery or servitude.144 The Convention differentiates 
between slavery and servitude by describing slavery as a when someone is ‘owned’ by another person, 
whilst servitude is described as when a person lives on the property of another and feels there is the 
impossibility of change to their situation.145  
The provisions in the Convention are similar to the stipulations in the instruments mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, however, some variations exist. The EHCR does not directly refer to migrants, asylum seekers or 
refugees, but it mentions ‘aliens.  The Fourth Protocol of the ECHR (Fourth Protocol) prohibits the 
collective expulsion of aliens.146 The term ‘alien’ does not only apply to foreigners that are legally present 
on the territory of a state. In Georgia v Russia (I), the ECtHR held that the terms also applied to –  
all those who have no actual right to nationality in a State, whether they are merely passing through a country 
or reside or are domiciled in it, whether they are refugees or entered the country on their own initiative, or 
whether they are stateless or possess another nationality. 147 
                                                 
142 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovay Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention and Human Rights 
7 ed (2017) 3.  
143 Amnesty International UK ‘What is the European Convention on Human Rights’ available at 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/what-is-the-european-convention-on-human-rights accessed on 4 January 2019.  
144 Article 4(1) of Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.  
145 B. Rainey, E. Wicks and C. Ovay Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention and Human Rights 7 ed (2017) 220. 
146 Article 4 of Protocol 4 of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
147 Para 168 of the Case of Georgis v. Russia (I) (Application no. 13255/07) (just 
satisfaction), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0131JUD001325507 , Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights 
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Further, the court determined that ‘collective expulsion’ is when there is any measure taken by the 
authorities, compelling aliens as a group, to leave the country.148 This is the case except where such a 
decision is made after there have been reasonable and objective examinations of each of the alien’s 
circumstances.149 The Fourth Protocol places a duty on member states not to participate in collective 
expulsion of aliens.150 This provision is clear however, the question arises as to whether the provision 
applies when migrants are expelled at sea. This also raises a question of the extent of accountability on 
the EU, considering that the acts of slavery are committed in Africa, and not on European territory. 
b. The European Agenda on Migration  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is a policy adopted by all states of the EU. 
Of relevance is Article 67 which states that member states shall have a ‘common policy on asylum, 
immigration and external border control’.151 This applies to all states excluding the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark, who may exercise discretion in the implementation of this article.152 
The EU acknowledged that the migration regulations that existed in European states prior to this common 
policy were subpar, and they agreed that the adoption of progressive provisions was required.153  In 
establishing progressive immigration regulations, a priority of the EU was to ensure that Europe continues 
to be a safe haven for those escaping persecution.154   The EU also aimed to maintain its high standards 
and reputation for having some of the best tertiary education institutions in the world.155 The EU also 
considered their tourism industry, which they did not wish compromise.156 Most importantly, the EU was 
committed to ensuring that Europe is prepared for unpredictable migration crises in the future.157  
In the formulation of the policy, the EU focused on the issue of migrant lives being lost at sea, particularly 
because at that time there had been many such deaths, resulting in washed up bodies depositing on 
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European shores.158 Secondly, the EU considered the dependence of migrants on smugglers and traffickers 
to smuggle them into Europe and the reluctance of migrants to consult institutions that have been 
established to assist them.159 They further assessed how they will confront the high volumes of people 
migrating into Europe and how each EU state may contribute towards a long-term plan to ensure the EU 
is prepared in the future.160 
A solution to the migration crisis entailed that the EU assist African states that were producing the highest 
number of migrants, with their immigration control mechanisms.161 Consequently, there have been various 
agreements between African and European states, including between Libya and Italy.162 
 
iii. The African Union  
a. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Banjul Charter)163 is implemented by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission). The Banjul Charter was established 
with the aim of creating an African approach to human rights, taking into consideration Africa’s history 
and struggles. The African Commission works to promote and enforce human rights, it also oversees the 
interpretation and implementation of the Banjul Charter.164  
The Banjul Charter explicitly states that ‘All forms of exploitation and of degradation of man particularly 
slavery, slave trade...shall be prohibited’.165 It also seeks to protect asylum seekers such as those entering 
Libya in an attempt to reach Europe. It states, ‘Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to 
seek and obtain asylum in other states in accordance with laws of these states and international law’.166 
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Again, implementation is dependent on state laws, and this may cause a problem in states where the human 
rights infrastructure is severely lacking. 
The Banjul Charter places an obligation on the African states to adopt legislative and other measures to 
give effect to the rights and duties of the Charter.167 In line with this, the African Commission imposes 
four main core obligations on the states - to respect, protect, promote and fulfil.168 States must ensure that 
domestic legislative provisions are adopted to enforce and protect these rights. 
Finally, the Banjul Charter is to be interpreted in accordance with the UN Charter and the UDHR. This is 
to promote the harmonization of international law. Libya is a signatory to the Charter and therefore has a 
duty to implement it.  
The provisions of the Charter are comprehensive and address a wide spectrum of human rights. 
Regardless, its implementation and enforcement remains to be a challenge. One of the main issues faced 
by the African Commission is that states ignore decisions made by the Commission.169 Furthermore, the 
Commission is very slow in deciding cases and this causes a detrimental backlog.170 However, the 
Commission is not the only body that monitors issues of human rights in the African region. The African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACtHPR) hears human rights claims. Unlike the Commission, a 
non-state party may not approach the court directly, unless their country laws stipulate that they can.171 
Nevertheless, the court itself is lacking in various ways and fails to hear many cases, despite the high 
volume of human rights violations currently taking place in African states.172 
 
iv. International Norms and Doctrines 
a. Responsibility to Protect  
The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, as mentioned above, was established in 2001.173 It was 
developed following numerous international debates on the idea of ‘right to intervention’. The right to 
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intervention caused debates in circumstances where international intervention was authorised but was 
argued to be inappropriate. It was similarly challenged in situations where it was not authorised but argued 
to be necessary.174 The shift from using ‘right to intervention’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’ places the 
focus on the civilians that need assistance.175 
For many years, the question of whether ‘state intervention’ is an infringement of ‘state sovereignty’ 
loomed over the international law realm. There are two forms of state sovereignty, internal and external 
sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is when the state has complete authority over the territory of that state.176 
External sovereignty is when a state is independent to other states, and not one state is above the other.177  
State sovereignty has been encoded by the UN Charter which prohibits the international community from 
using or threatening to use force against another state.178 Moreover, it prohibits the UN from intervening 
in the internal affairs of states nor is a state required to submit matters to the UN for settlement. The 
interpretation of sovereignty is subject to Chapter VII of the Charter.179 Despite this, there have been 
questions raised on the absoluteness of sovereignty especially where there is a need for humanitarian 
intervention, for example during the Rwandan genocide. 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine provides a change in the approach of intervention. The wording 
focuses more on the victims, rather than the international bodies that will be taking the action.180 
Moreover, it gives the state an opportunity to take action internally. It is based on the ideology that this 
responsibility lies first with the state as it is in the best position to make an informed decision on matters 
occurring within its jurisdiction.181 Only when states are unable or unwilling to address such matters, or 
if persons outside the state jurisdiction are in direct threat of adverse action, does it allow for the 
international community to intervene.182 Finally, as mentioned earlier, it not only establishes a 
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responsibility to protect but a further one to prevent any such abuses and the responsibility to rebuild after 
the incident.183 
As mentioned earlier, this doctrine was agreed upon by all heads of state in 2005.184 They all agreed to 
take collective action in a timely and decisive manner if necessary, in line with Chapters VI and VIII of 
the UN Charter.185 The UN clearly states that this doctrine only applies to four main crimes and one of 
these being the crime against humanity. As mentioned above, slavery is a crime against humanity 
according to the Rome Statute. 
As a member state of the UN, Libya is one of the states that agreed to this doctrine. This means the 
responsibility to protect applies to the Libyan government, first and foremost. According to the first pillar, 
they have a responsibility to protect their own population from such a crime. If demonstrated that the 
government is unable or unwilling to take action to prevent this, it would then warrant for international 
intervention.  
b. The Principle of Non-Refoulement  
As has been shown by the various reports from the UN and other organisations, the migrants are the main 
subjects of the human rights abuses, including the slave trade. Considering that they are not nationals of 
Libya, the question is whether Libya has a duty to even accept these migrants and to protect them.  
There are various reasons why people are travelling to Libya, and not all the migrants in Libya are there 
because they are fleeing from conflict. There are three categories of persons that flee to Libya: the purely 
economic migrants, mixed migrants who flee because of difficulties in their own states and are seeking a 
stable or better economic circumstance and finally asylum seekers who are looking to gain refugee 
status.186 As a result, the manner in which a state is obliged to accept these different groups differs. It is 
then important to understand what the difference is between these categories of persons.  
The IOM defines a migrant as a person; 
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…who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual 
place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or 
involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.187 
From this definition encompasses a wide range of circumstances that these migrants could be in, and it is 
the individual circumstances that determine under what category each migrant falls. A migrant who has 
left voluntarily is generally seen as a person who leaves their country seeking better social or economic 
opportunities. They still have the protection of their state and they are able to return to their state if 
necessary.188 The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)189 
provides an international standard for the definition of a refugee. A refugee, also seen as an involuntary 
migrant, is a person who is fleeing their state for fear of being persecuted. In this case, they have no other 
option but to leave in order to protect their lives.190 These people are normally fleeing from issues like 
war or internal conflict and this is the category that many of the migrants in Libya fall into.191 Finally, an 
asylum-seeker is similar to a refugee, they are seeking international protection but have not yet attained 
the status of a refugee. However, the state may not turn an asylum-seeker away until they have been 
examined in a fair procedure.192 
Therefore, in order for a migrant or an asylum-seeker to reach the status of a refugee, they need to meet 
certain requirements, on top of this, a refugee received the best protection out of all three. In order to 
ensure there, the Refugee Convention introduced the principle of non-refoulement. According to this 
principle, no contracting state may expel a refugee to where their life is in danger, even more, this principle 
is still open to asylum-seekers whilst they await recognition.193 
Looking at the definition provided, many of the migrants present in Libya fit the criteria of an ‘asylum-
seeker’. Despite this, in order to determine who is entitled to protection, the state would have to check 
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under what circumstances the migrant has come to Libya and if that person is entitled to refugee status or 
the status of an asylum seeker. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
It is clear through the history of Libya that there have been abuses against migrants in Libya since migrant 
workers have travelled to the country. These abuses have only increased over the years as the number of 
migrants has greatly increased.  
All relevant human rights bodies condemn and criminalise the act of slavery. In terms of the Rome Statute, 
it is declared to be a crime against humanity. Despite Libya not being a party to the ICC, the fact that the 
group of persons facing the abuses are from countries that are party to it means the ICC still has jurisdiction 
over the matter. However, this would only become applicable at the moment that someone is apprehended 
and tried in court.  
With regard to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, it is important to determine to what extent the 
concerned human rights bodies and Libya had a responsibility to protect. The thesis will address this 
question. 
The next two chapters will analyse the responses of the four bodies, starting with the Libyan government 
and then the AU. It will focus on how they reacted to the crisis, and how they should have reacted in terms 
of the international standards.  
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CHAPTER III – THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LIBYA AND THE AFRICAN UNION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the accountability of the Libyan government and the AU in the slavery crisis in 
Libya. This analysis will be based on the relevant international conventions, norms as well as definitions 
that were referred to in the previous chapter.  
The Libyan government and the AU are the most relevant governing bodies in the slavery situation in 
Libya, and their reaction to the crisis is crucial. Although there have been several reports published about 
the existence of slavery in Libya, both the government and AU have not reacted with urgency. 
Libyan law does not provide for any protection for migrants and therefore they are easily targeted for 
slavery. Despite numerous reports and international pressures on the Libyan government to enact 
legislation that will protect migrants, these urges have not been heeded to. To provide context and 
perspective on the current positions of the Libyan Government and AU, it is important to understand the 
background of the crisis and how it has evolved.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The rise in migration in Libya can be attributed to the Arab Spring that spread throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa.194 The Arab Spring was an uprising movement that originated from a single act of 
protest by a Tunis vendor on 17 December 2010, who set himself on fire in front of the local governor’s 
office.195 He died less than a month later on 4 January 2011. His protest sparked mass opposition in Tunisia 
against the autocratic government that had ruled over the state for more than two decades.196 Within a 
week of his death, the Tunisian government fell apart and the President went into hiding.197 During the 
uprising, protesters took to social media to expose the crisis and subsequently the protests aroused global 
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interest. This, in turn, motivated the citizens of the surrounding states to also launch similar uprisings.198 
By 25th January 2011, 11 states had joined the uprising including Libya, Syria and Sudan. 
The reasons for the uprising in these states varied. Some of the explanations given by the protestors were 
lack of democracy, human rights violations, the need for the improvement of living conditions and some 
were aiming to overthrow the ruling regime.199 The effects of the uprising also differed from one state to 
another, depending on the reason of the uprising. There were three forms of activism that were initiated - 
the people fighting against government regimes, the people fighting against other civilians and finally the 
fight between the two regimes.200 Regardless, all states experienced high levels of displacement of their 
citizens.201 
As a result of the uprisings, many of the states found themselves facing civil war and many of the 
governments had to fight against insurgents within the state. Not only are the governments fighting against 
rebel groups, but the rebel groups are also fighting against each other for control over the states.202 Out of 
the 50 million estimated migrants in the world, Syria remains the highest contributor. Syrians were once 
the largest number of migrants in Libya trying to crossover to Europe, however, over time they have 
diverted their travel route. Most of them are seeking refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.203  
There are three main routes to Europe by sea. These channels are the Western Mediterranean route to 
Spain through Morocco; the Central Mediterranean route to Italy through Libya and finally the Eastern 
Mediterranean route which is usually to Greece through Turkey.204 The Central Mediterranean route from 
Libya has become the busiest of them all.205 As a result of the instability in Libya, many migrants choose 
this route as it is easier to enter the state due to the lack of border security. The instability made it easier 
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to evade the coast guards. This route is highly risky as it is also the most dangerous route out of the three.206 
It has the highest number of missing and dead at sea migrants, in 2016 there were an estimated 4 500 
deaths.207 
The reasons for the high number of migrants entering state Libya vary. Some are there with the purpose 
of transiting to Europe, whilst others hope to improve their economic position by seeking employment 
opportunities in Libya.208 The categories of persons that flee to Libya may be identified as the purely 
economic migrants, mixed migrants who flee because of difficulties in their own states and are seeking a 
stable or better economic circumstance and finally, asylum seekers.209  
The most prevalent migrants in Libya are from Niger, Egypt and Chad.210 In most cases, these are pure 
economic migrants that have travelled to seek some form of economic gain.211 Over the years, this has 
changed significantly and the number of migrants travelling from West and Central Africa has also 
increased.212 However, it is strange to consider that many would flock to such a state for economic gain 
when the current state of the Libyan economy is dire. 
This is not the first time migrants have travelled to Libya in the masses. Libya has always been a 
destination state for migrants. Immediately prior to the uprisings in 2011, it was estimated that there were 
about 1.3 million migrants in Libya.213 Following the uprising protests which led to the downfall of Libyan 
president Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the dynamics of people travelling to Libya changed.214 In 2011, 
after Muammar Gaddafi was executed, the political situation in Libya was unstable. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the IOM arranged for the evacuation of 143 000 migrants from 
Libya back to their countries of origin.215On the other hand, others saw this political unrest as an 
opportunity to exploit the weakened government. As a result of the current unrest, the border control and 
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the coast guards are not as efficient as they used to be, making it easier to enter the state and to eventually 
be smuggled to Europe.216 
 
III. LIBYA 
i. The Conduct of the Relevant Government Bodies 
The journey of migrants through Libya exposes them to a vicious cycle of abuse by the different 
government institutions. From the moment they enter the county, either through smugglers or on their 
own, they are placed in detention centres.217 Libya does not have laws that differentiate between refugees, 
asylum seekers and migrants. As a result, all foreigners entering the country who do not possess valid 
immigration documentation are considered illegal migrants.218  
The migrants are kept in detention centres for months or they are gathered by smugglers to travel to their 
final destination by boat.219 In most cases, these boats are not built for the high seas, and breakdown in 
the international waters.220 Once at sea, their fate depends on whether they are caught by the Libyan Coast 
Guard (LCG) or a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO).221 Being caught by the coast guard means a 
journey back to Libyan land where they are rebooked into detention centres.222 
a. The Libyan Coast Guard 
The migrant issues in Libya have been present for many years. The government has been in 
communication with the European countries about the issues years before the Arab Spring even broke out. 
In 2008, Italy and Libya entered into an agreement whose terms stipulated that Italy would pay Libya US$ 
five billion over a period of five years. In exchange, Libya would work to curb the arrival of migrants into 
Italy, by strengthening their coastal force through funding provided by Italy and then later on, the EU.223 
The agreement was that the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) would strengthen efforts to ensure that migrants 
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that attempt to reach Europe are captured and returned to Libya. The LCG is under the authority of the 
Libyan Ministry of Internal Affairs. This bilateral agreement raised red flags for the UN. The UN 
Committee against Torture, in particular, was concerned that this agreement did not take into consideration 
the human rights of the migrants. The Committee recommended a revision of the agreement to reflect a 
human rights-centred approach.224 The agreement was not amended and after the Arab Spring uprisings 
broke out in 2011 and the country was unstable, the LCG was not able to operate effectively.  
Soon after the uprisings, the number of migrants travelling the Central Mediterranean route to Italy began 
to increase again. As the number of migrants coming in from the Central Mediterranean routes grew, 
Libya began to work with the European states again in 2016.225 In 2017, Italy decided to revive its 
agreement with Libya. Italy invested funds to strengthen the LCG to ensure that the number of migrants 
leaving the Libyan coast was reduced.226  
International human rights organization, Amnesty International, reported that they had documented 
‘shootings, abandonment, beatings by the Libyan coast guard themselves as they were rescuing people.’227 
In 2017, a video surfaced revealing members of the LCG whipping migrants in a boat.228 Beyond the 
allegations that the LCG were committing human rights abuses, this was the first visual evidence showing 
that the allegations were a reality. What then followed were various news reports of the LCG purposefully 
abandoning migrants at sea to drown, including a mother and child being abandoned on a small boat at 
sea.229  
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In June of 2018, the United Nations identified six Libyan nationals suspected of being involved in human 
trafficking.230 One of the six people was a regional head of the LCG.231 This severely compromised 
international confidence in Libya.  
b. Abuses in the Detention Centres 
As aforementioned, the Libyan government does not differentiate between illegal migrants and asylum 
seekers or refugees.232 This has resulted in the perpetual abuse of migrants.  Additionally, state 
immigration processes are applied inconsistently on migrants. Migrants may be arbitrarily detained for 
extended periods of time, some may be deported back to their states whilst others are kept in rotation from 
one detention centre to the next.233   
The number of victims of human trafficking and slavery in Libya is unclear, however, it is estimated that 
the current number of migrants in Libya is about 670 000.234 It is this group of migrants that are trapped 
in Libya and exposed to slavery. Many of them remain detained in detention centres. In 2017, there were 
an estimated 20 000 migrants kept in detention centres.235 Today there is still an estimated 15 000 migrants 
in these detention centres.236 It is not clear how many detention centres are in Libya, but there have been 
various estimates ranging from 17 to 35, suggested by the UNHCR,237 the IOM and other NGOs.238  
In terms of the structure of the state affairs, the General Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration 
(DCIM) within the Ministry of Interior is mandated to supervise the state detention centres.239 However, 
due to the political circumstances of the country, there are certain areas in Libya that are still under the 
control of rebel groups, as a result, some of the detention centres are also under their control.240 A recent 
UNSMIL report to the UN Secretary-General shows that only around 6,000 of the 15,000 detained 
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migrants are under the control of the DCIM.241 However, this information is not accurate as it is only 
based on the limited research that the UNSMIL was allowed to conduct. It is estimated that there are many 
more in DCIM detention centres.  
The general condition of detention centres in the state is abysmal regardless of whether they are managed 
the de jure government or rebels. The UNSMIL reported that the detainees are often detained for long 
periods of time awaiting trial.242 There are several cases of abuse reported in detention centres, including 
frequent beatings and rape.243 Detainees are forced to live in overcrowded spaces with no food or water, 
forcing migrants to drink water from toilets.244   
Unfortunately, these are not the worst atrocities that are taking place within these detention centres. In 
2017, American media house CNN released a video which revealed a human auction taking place in 
Libya.245 Although reports of slavery had been published before, the video prompted a reaction from the 
international community. The video did not reveal the locations of the slave markets. The narrative of the 
footage was that the enslaved migrants had been rescued from their smugglers and sent to detention centres 
where they were safe from this abuse.246 Contrary to this, there have since been many of testimonies 
collected by various institutions where the migrants attest to being sold from the detention centres.247 
Amnesty International conducted interviews with 74 migrants in 2017 and some of the migrants shared 
the details of how they are sold from within the detention centres.248 One of the migrants being held in a 
state-controlled detention centre stated: 
They are beating us here every morning, every evening. We don’t eat, we catch diseases, there are lots of 
diseases here. Our relatives, our families don’t know where we are. It’s been more than six months, seven 
months now. They don’t know if we are dead or still alive. They tell Europeans that they caught us on the 
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sea and that’s not true. They are selling us. They are running the prison and organising the departures for 
Italy.249 
Others shared of the abuses they faced in these DCIM detention centres:  
In prison they would hit us often. You see these marks? [He took his hat off to show big scars on both the 
right and left sides of his head.] They did it with a metallic net, rolled as a baton to hit me on the head. I 
fainted – I was told that others started crying and thought I was dead, because plenty of blood [was flowing] 
from my head. It was the only time I was beaten this way, but they beat me many other times. And they killed 
many boys, many… I saw many people dying in prison, either because they fell sick or were beaten… Guards 
were Libyan – they used to beat everybody, without a reason. Before entering the prison, police search you 
and take away all money, phone, everything. They asked me to call my family to ask for money, but I had 
lost all contacts so I never called. But I saw one boy in the prison – they gave him a phone to call the family, 
and they beat him with a metal stick while [he was] on the phone, on arms and everywhere… After five 
months I escaped with other people, but the guards started shooting and many were killed. I don’t know how 
many were killed, but I saw some falling and screaming.250 
Although there is no clear indication of how many state-run centres are partaking in this and how many 
migrants have been sold, it is clear that employees of the DCIM are involved. Others also shared how they 
are captured from the sea by the LCG and sold back to the detention centres.  
 
ii. Liability of Libya 
Through the various testimonies that have been shared by the migrants and the reports of the United 
Nations, it is evident that some of the Libyan officials are involved in these atrocities and are profiting 
from them. 
From Libya’s perspective, detaining these migrants for long periods of time without trial is in line with 
their national laws. As a dualist state, despite the Banjul Charter providing that all migrants have a right 
to be protected and seek asylum where they qualify for it,251 the Libyan government has chosen to not 
incorporate this in their national laws. As stated previously, according to their national laws, there is no 
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difference between a migrant, asylum seeker and a refugee. The Libyan law stipulates that if anyone enters 
the country unlawfully, they may be detained for an undetermined period of time and they may be forced 
to carry out labour work.252  
This law is detrimental for refugees and asylum seekers that travel to Libya to seek refuge. It prevents 
them from obtaining to necessary assistance that they require. The Libyan government de facto 
implements the principle of non-refoulement,253 but this only applies to ‘Eritreans, Ethiopians, Iraqis, 
Palestinians, Somalis, Sudanese of Darfuri origin and Syrians’.254 They have also allowed the UNHCR to 
provide these nationals with basic support. This is the extent of domestication of the UN Refugee 
Convention in Libya.  
In May of 2018, the Attorney General’s Office of Libya released a statement claiming that they had issued 
arrest warrants for 205 individuals suspected of being a part of the illegal migration, human trafficking, 
slavery and rapes.255 However, since the report was made, there has not been a follow up by the office to 
identify the individuals or confirm whether they were arrested and how many have been arrested thus far. 
Libya has lost its credibility with the international community especially after many published reports of 
corruption within the government.256  
Migrants are a very vulnerable group in Libya. Although some are only looking to make a better living 
for themselves, most are refugees and asylum seekers who have no choice but to leave their states in order 
to save their lives. 
 
iii. Applicability of the Law 
Libya is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, and therefore the government is not bound by its 
provisions. However, as previously stated, Libya implements de facto the principle of non-refoulement,257 
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applicable only to some states.258 Consequently, migrants suffer discrimination also on the basis of 
nationality.  
Additionally, Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, and therefore cannot be held accountable by it. 
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the heinous human rights violations in Libya are being committed by 
Libyans against foreigners. The ICC still has jurisdiction crimes committed against nationals of members 
of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute. African parties to the Rome Statute include Chad, Ghana, 
Niger and Nigeria.259 Migrants in Libya that are nationals of these countries are protected by the Rome 
Statute and their governments may bring claims against Libya before the ICC for the violations against 
their nationals.  
The acts taking place in Libya against migrants have been determined to be acts of slavery by the UNSG. 
Nonetheless, for an act to be a crime against humanity, it must be an ‘act… committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’.260 
In terms of the Kunarac Case, acts of violence must be present to constitute an ‘attack’.261 It is clear that 
there have been acts of violence committed, considering the testimonies of migrants that accuse officers 
of beating and torturing them in detention centres. But are the attacks ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’? 
Despite the evidence of slavery taking place in Libya and the estimated 670 000 migrants in Libya, it is 
yet to be determined how many migrants are slaves.262 Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the number of 
migrants that are victims of slavery. However, the numerous testimonies collected from migrants in 
various detention centres, suggest that these attacks are widespread. In terms of the ‘systematic’ nature of 
the attacks, the organised manner in which the migrants are transferred from one place to another, and 
how they are sold in a repetitive cycle demonstrate that the trade is organised and systemic.  
The migrants that are targeted are those held in the detention centres. The migrants are not involved in the 
conflict and are therefore civilians. Further, buyers are aware of where to participate in the trade, which 
suggests that there is structure and knowledge of the trade. The activities taking place in Libya meet the 
requirements of a crime against humanity.  
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Revealing the acts of slavery taking place in Libya as crimes against humanity is necessary to demonstrate 
the state duty to protect. As explained, the first tier of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect requires 
the state to take reasonable measure to protect the persons within its territory against human rights 
violations.263 Only if a state is unwilling or unable to do so, international intervention is justified.264 
Regardless of the current political state of Libya, the state has a de jure government. Should the 
government not be able to take the necessary action, they still have a duty to request international 
assistance. The government have been willing to work with UN agencies that are present in the country, 
however, the level of relief they can provide is limited by the lack of resources and the control of the 
Libyan government. The government has not allowed or requested assistance towards the detention 
centres, where many of the migrants claim to be subjected to slavery. The government also continues to 
fund the LCG despite the human rights abuse claims against them. Clearly, Libya’s cooperation with the 
UN is not with the intention to eradicate slavery in Libya.  
Aside from the arrest of the 205 persons that were suspected of participating in the slave trade,265 the 
Libya government has offered no follow up reports on the progress of the arrests. There have been no 
other significant steps taken by the government to ensure the elimination of the slave trade. As a signatory 
of the ICCPR, the government has failed to take measures to protect migrants in Libya. The state has 
failed to adopt law or policy reforms to ensure the protection of migrants, including asylum seekers and 
refugees. The facts provide a clear indication that the government is failing to protect those within their 
jurisdiction, in which case the international community has a right and responsibility to intervene, under 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
 
IV. THE AFRICAN UNION 
One of the main causes of the migrant crisis is the conflicts that are ongoing in Africa and the Middle-
East. The AU has made efforts to reduce and end these conflicts through peacekeeping missions and other 
strategies. On Libya, the AU did not respond to the slave trade publications until the CNN video clip was 
broadcast. 
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In 2015, the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AU Chairperson) made a public statement on the 
migration crisis. She stated that while steps were being taken to control the situation, there was no quick 
solution to the problem.266 In 2017, following the exposure of the Libyan slave crisis, it was expected that 
the AU would be quick to provide some rapid relief. The AU Chairperson released a statement and 
highlighted the need for investigations to be carried out at once.267 The AU Chairperson deployed an 
envoy to engage with the government of Libya.268  
Within days of the AU Chairpersons statement, an envoy was deployed to Libya.269 The Envoy consulted 
with the Libyan office of the President and Prime Minister of the de jure government, the Minister of 
Justice as well as the Office of the Attorney General.270 The envoy also inspected one of the state-run 
detention centres. She affirmed the mistreatment of the migrants as well as the auctioning of the 
migrants.271 Following submission of a report to the AU by the envoy, the AU commissioner assured that 
the AU would work with the IOM in their Voluntary Humanitarian Evacuation of Migrants Plan, to ensure 
that more migrants that were in the state-run detention centres were repatriated to their countries of 
origin.272 The AU soon devised a three-point plan, which involved the return of approximately 3 500 
migrants from Libya. This initiative was criticised as there was an estimated number of 300 000- 400 000 
migrants in Libya.273 The plans to rescue these migrants do not seem to have a significant impact on the 
migrants in Libya, whose total is estimated to be 670 000.274Additionally, the AU Chairperson vowed to 
work with the Libyan government in shutting down some of the detention centres in Libya.275 
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The African Commission also issued a statement condemning these acts of slavery and promised to 
embark on a fact-finding mission.276 This mission is yet to be conducted and the Commission has received 
criticism for this. The AU-EU and UN Task Force led by the IOM did manage to return 20 000 migrants 
back to their states of origin within a month of the CNN broadcast.277 Another 5 200 were also returned 
with the help of the AU member states.278  
Although the AU reacted soon after the headlines made waves, this was not the first time that there had 
been speculation of slave markets in Libya. And even in this case, there had been no urgent reaction from 
them.279 The AU continues to host workshops as well as discussions on how to solve the issues in Libya. 
However, it has not implemented effective strategies to reduce the flow of migrants into Libya or address 
the problem of slavery. 
 
i. Liability of the African Union  
The AU expressed intentions to protect the migrants in Libya, however, as seen above, the AU’s efforts 
were minimal. According to the AU Constitutive Act,280 the AU has a duty to protect and promote human 
and peoples’ rights in accordance with the Banjul Charter.281 The Banjul Charter prohibits acts of slavery 
and slave trade282 and the acts of slavery occurring in Libya constitute crimes against humanity, according 
to international standards. The Constitutive Act also confers the right on the AU to interfere in the internal 
affairs of a state where crimes against humanity are committed.283 This is subject to a decision by the 
General Assembly of the AU.284 
The AU may take a decision to intervene with the decision of the Assembly or at the request of any 
member state.285 The AU is not required to seek the consent of the state concerned. This ensures rapid 
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action by the AU where crimes against humanity are being committed.286 However, the AU is still 
accountable to the UN in these situations.287 Prior to any intervention, the AU is required to comply with 
the UN Charter and obtain consent from the UNSC.288 
The AU has failed to take all necessary steps in order to be as effective as possible in ending the slave 
trade crisis in Libya. In addition to its abovementioned inadequacies, the AU has failed to request 
resources from African states to assist its efforts. Further, despite the opportunity to intervene in the affairs 
of Libya, the Assembly has failed to initiate that action. As a result, the AU has failed to carry out their 
duty as the regional body to ensure that peace and security are upheld.  
Therefore, the AU has failed to fulfil the duty it has in terms of its Constitutive Act and the Banjul Charter 
to ensure that the human rights abuses were controlled or put to an end. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Libyan government has a responsibility to stop the slave trade in Libya and the AU has a duty to 
intervene in the atrocities. Regardless of their public resolutions to react effectively, there has been 
minimal initiatives from both sides.  
The Libyan government has been receptive to collaborating with UN agencies in the country, however, 
the government is not taking steps to enact migrant protective laws or policies. The government’s efforts, 
including the arrest of the 205 people have not adequately addressed the slave trade in Libya.  
The AU has collaborated with IOM, the UN and EU but it has not conducted any substantial investigations 
on the Libyan slave trade and they have not sought assistance from member states on the matter.  
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CHAPTER IV – THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union is a political and economic union between 28 European countries that, among other 
undertakings, have committed to protecting human rights in Europe.289 Unlike the AU, the EU is not a 
regional body. Through the years, as the number of migrants travelling to European states increased, the 
EU and various European states adopted new norms and laws to address the immigration situation. The 
EU has revised its strategy, from being tolerant and accommodating to migrants, to consolidating efforts 
to return them.    
The United Nations was established to promote global peace and security and has been involved in 
peacekeeping in Libya since the time of the uprising. It is imperative to assess the work that the UN has 
done in Libya in order to determine if it has fulfilled its duty.   
 
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
i. Background 
For decades, Europe has been a hub for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants escaping undesirable 
situations in their countries. For migration purposes, the European states are divided into arrival states, 
transit states and destination states.290 There is a larger financial burden on the coastal ‘arrival’ states due 
to the EU policy that requires that all asylum-seekers are processed in the first state that they arrive.291 
Prior to the migrant crisis, the EU was assisting Libya with attaining political stability and reintegration 
into international cooperation. However, when the flow of migrants from the Central Mediterranean route 
increased, the EU shifted its focus to devising strategies to prevent migrants from arriving in Europe.292   
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In 2013, the Italian Government adopted human rights initiatives to address human trafficking and 
smuggling.293 The strategy focused on a search and rescue plan for migrants and apprehending 
smugglers.294 Operation Mare Nostrum, which was administered by the Italian Navy, rescued 150 000 
migrants in both international and Libyan territory 295 and succeeded in apprehending 500 smugglers.296 
Unfortunately, its success was short lived as it dissolved only a year after it had been operational. One of 
the reasons for its termination was that Italy was spending over five times the intended budget and this 
became a financial burden on the state.297 
In 2015, Europe experienced the greatest influx of migrants that they had ever recorded.298 This was 
caused by the increase of instability in African states, the Middle-East and some parts of Asia. This 
resulted in the biggest crisis in Europe since World War II.299 In 2015, the IOM reported that the EU had 
received 1.3 million asylum-seeker claims, double the number of asylum seekers in 2014.300 At the 
beginning of the migrant crisis, the Eastern Mediterranean Route was the most popular and Greece 
received 850 000 migrants by the sea - over nine times the 77 000 that was received in 2014.301 As a result 
of the instability in Libya, the Central Mediterranean route from Libya has become the busiest route to 
Europe by sea.302  
The EU has been criticised by Amnesty International and other human rights organisations for not 
responding adequately to the crisis, and allegedly perpetuating the slave trade that has been exposed in 
Libya.303 The manner in which the EU has addressed the migrant crisis has varied over the years as the 
number of migrants grew. In the beginning, states like Germany were willing to accommodate migrants 
in their states. This relieved coastal states who were the point of entry for most migrants. However as 
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more migrants travelled into Europe, the states began to change their policies and adopted stricter criteria 
for immigration.304  
The EU acted as a catalyst in ensuring European states pushed back on the migrants as pressure began to 
rise. For instance, when the number of migrants entering the Greek Islands through Turkey soared, the 
EU established a Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey. In this Memorandum, Turkey and the EU 
agreed that migrants arriving in the Greek Islands would be returned to Turkey. In turn, Turkey would 
receive funds from the EU to manage the migrant population. Further, the EU granted Turkish nationals 
visa-free travel to Europe.305 As the number of migrants entering Europe through the Central 
Mediterranean routes also increased, Italy signed an agreement with Libya. This agreement stipulated that 
the migrants arriving in Italy would be returned to Libya and Italy would invest funds to strengthen the 
Libyan Coast Guard and ensure that the number of migrants leaving the Libyan coast was reduced.306 
This strategy was successful and the number of migrants dying at sea had subsided. More efforts were 
adopted. In 2015, from January to April it was estimated that 1 in 16 migrants died at sea, however after 
their emergency meeting wherein the council established a new operational plan, the number of deaths 
decreased to 1 in 427.307 This decrease in deaths was recorded between 27 April and 29 June, reflecting 
that the EU was acting quickly. Other EU states, including the UK who were not obliged to assist, 
participated in these efforts. Unfortunately, these initiatives were not maintained. By 2017, the deaths at 
sea had risen to 1 in 43 deaths and finally, in 2018 the Central Mediterranean route was reported to be the 
deadliest, with 1 in 18 deaths.308 
As the migration crisis worsened in the EU, the EU drafted a migration plan that claimed to ensure that 
the EU would respond effectively and assist migrants. This was purported to be more than a migration 
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deterrent strategy.309 The EU decided to adjust its Operational Plan for sea rescue in May of 2015. The 
Plan’s budget was increased, the perimeter for sea rescue had widened and more states were donating 
ships and deploying members of their navies to help with a sea rescue.310 The European States were not 
all affected in the same way.311 European states’ responses to the migrant arrivals varied and there was 
considerable friction between the arrival and transit states.312 Some of the Europeans believed the cause 
of the crisis was the EU’s lax border policies. Some European states began to consider leaving the EU, 
following the UK.313  
The EU external border control had established Operation Triton which was primarily for border control 
and surveillance, but they did eventually begin to help Italy with the search and rescue of migrants, on a 
smaller scale.314 A year later, the EU also established a Navy plan, Operation Sophia, which was aimed at 
neutralizing trafficking and smuggling. However, The Operation’s mandate has expanded.315 In 2017, the 
EU aimed to extend Operation Sophia to train and equip the LCG in strategies to prevent migrants from 
reaching European territory.316 This initiative was successful in decreasing the number of migrants to 
arrive in Europe. Whilst Operation Sophia rescued just over 2,000 migrants in 2018, the Libyan Coast 
Guard had greater success in intercepting over 14,000 migrants and returning them to Libyan soil.317 
In 2017, Italy entered into another agreement with the de jure government of Libya.318 The objective of 
this memorandum was to finance and support the Libyan Ministry of Defence. This economic injection 
would provide finance and technological support to the LCG towards preventing ‘illegal migration’.319 
                                                 
309 European Union: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda on Migration, 13 May 
2015, COM (2015) 240 at 2. 
310 Ibid at 3. 
311 Alexandru Apetroe ‘The European migration crisis. Which consequences affecting the stability of the European Union?’ 
(2016) ResearchGate at 3. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Kate Lyons and Gordon Darroch ‘Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who will be next to leave the EU’ The Guardian 27 June 2016 
accessed on 6 February 2019 available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-who-will-be-
next-to-leave-the-eu.  
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This agreement was supported by the EU and endorsed in the Malta Declaration.320 The UN, however, 
submitted that it was concerned the agreement did not reflect a human rights-based approach.  
Eventually, a Libya based human rights organisation instituted legal proceedings matter to contest the 
validity of the memorandum. The Tripoli Appeal’s Court annulled the memorandum and it could not be 
enforced.321 The government appealed the decision at the Supreme Court and the Court overturned the 
annulment.322This agreement permitted the Italian government to provide the LCG with boats, training 
and a radar system that would assist them to prevent migrants from crossing the sea. The number of 
migrants crossing the sea has reduced and the LCG has been successful in returning many migrants to 
Libya.  
Not only did the Italian government extend assistance to the LCG, but it also introduced a Code of Conduct 
for the NGOs that were partaking in the search and rescues of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea.323 Some 
of the restrictions on the NGOs stipulated that they may not enter Libyan territory and they may not flag 
down a boat with migrants or smugglers.324 The UN stepped in to advise that this would harm the rescue 
efforts of the NGOs in the international waters,325 however, the EU and Italy argued that this Code was in 
compliance with international law. The EU continues to use several tactics to frustrate NGO efforts, 
including ordering that they do not interfere with the work of the LCG and even impounding their 
vessels.326 Libya supports these tactics and has declared that the issue is for the Libyan Navy to handle, 
and not NGOs.327 The government has further accused NGOs of aiding smugglers.  
Although the initiatives of the EU to control migrations were successful in their initial stages, the 
inconsistency and negligent execution of implementation have resulted in ineffectiveness. 
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ii. The Liability of the European Union  
In 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe held passed a resolution on the interception 
of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers at sea: 
[T]he Assembly calls on member states, when conducting maritime border surveillance operations, whether 
in the context of preventing smuggling and trafficking in human beings or in connection with border 
management, be it in the exercise of de jure or de facto jurisdiction, to: refrain from any practices that might 
be tantamount to direct or indirect refoulement, including on the high seas, in keeping with the UNHCR’s 
interpretation of the extraterritorial application of that principle and with the relevant judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights.328 
Non-refoulement is an international principle in the Refugee Convention that prohibits contracting states 
from returning refugees and asylum seekers to states where they may be persecuted.329 According to the 
above resolution, the principle extends to the high seas.  
As discussed earlier, the EU’s human rights convention, the ECHR prohibits the collective expulsion of 
‘aliens’.330 According to the definition provided for by the ECtHR, this includes refugees and persons that 
have no right to nationality in the country.331 ‘Collective expulsion’ has been described as any measure 
taken by the authorities, compelling aliens, as a group to leave the country.332 The challenge is that many 
of the migrants do not arrive at their destination in European territory. They are often captured and returned 
to Libya either by the LCG, EU or Italian authorities. For purposes of the ECHR provision, it was therefore 
unclear as to whether this act of capturing migrants on the high seas and returning them to Libya 
constitutes collective action. 
At the ECtHR, Italy333 and Greece334 submitted that these acts did not fall under the definition of 
‘collective action’ as intended by the ECHR. The Court decided that the text of the Protocol did not 
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preclude extraterritorial application. The Court stated that it was vital to take into consideration the 
extraterritorial trails that migrants use to travel to Europe in order for the provision to be effective.335 
The EU has a duty to ensure that the states comply with the provisions of the ECHR. Regrettably, EU has 
not only failed in its duty to prevent a state from protecting migrants but has been complicit in the 
interception of the migrants. Despite the EU’s knowledge of the persecution migrants would be exposed 
to in Libya, it continued to fund the interceptions. The EU has substantially contributed to the escalation 
of violence suffered by these migrants in Libya. 
 
III. THE UNITED NATIONS  
i. Background 
After the civil war in Libya, and considering the political instability in the state, in 2011 the UNSC passed 
a resolution establishing the UNSMIL.336 The main objective of UNSMIL was to safeguard a peaceful 
political transitional phase as well as stabilise Libya by restoring the political relationships, promoting the 
rule of law and promoting and protecting human rights.337  
In order to guide and facilitate a peaceful transition, ensuring the promotion of human rights in the country 
was crucial. Unfortunately, human rights monitoring was not a part of the UNSMIL mandate they were 
limited to reporting on the violations. These reports revealed the deteriorating state of the treatment of 
migrants in Libya.  
In 2012, the UNSMIL reported on the effects of the absence of a legal framework to protect refugees, 
asylum seekers and migrants.338 Migrants were arbitrarily arrested and detained, without legal recourse.339 
Despite efforts of organisations like the IOM and the UNHCR to provide some humanitarian relief in the 
detention centres, the migrants inside were suffering immensely. Additionally, assistance was restricted 
as Libya’s Ministry of Interior was unable to gain control over all the detention centres.340 By 2013, 
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UNSMIL reported that the situation in the detention centres controlled by the Ministry of Interior had 
continued to deteriorate but the Ministry of Justice did interject to improve conditions.341 They also 
reported the adoption of a new law criminalising torture, enforced disappearances and discrimination342 
aimed at reducing the human rights abuses that the migrants were subjected to. Besides this, Libya had 
still not made any further reforms on its laws that specifically addressed the protection of migrants.343 
In the following years, as the inflow of migrants increased, the Mission remained concerned about the 
inhumane conditions of the detention centres, as well as the lack of progress in developing a law to protect 
these migrants.344 In 2015, at the peak of the European migration crisis, the UNSMIL reported that the 
2014 conflict in Libya had exposed migrants to more dire circumstances.345 Cases of arbitrary detention 
and abuse in detention centres had significantly increased.346 Additionally, this conflict depleted major 
state resources that had been allocated for border security, as a result, migrant smuggling into Libya 
became easier.347 During this time, different organs of the UN provided humanitarian assistance to the 
migrants, including 500 tons of food from the World Food Programme (WFP) and other supplies from 
IOM and UNHCR.348 
In 2016, UNSMIL reported on the continual abuses in the detention centres and armed groups’ frequent 
access into these centres.349 Torture and forced labour were rife.350 Regardless, the IOM and the UNHCR 
continued to provide humanitarian relief.351 The IOM assisted in the facilitation of the safe return of over 
20 000 migrants back to nine countries in Africa. The IOM further, continues to provide humanitarian 
relief through non-food items and basic commodities.352 The UNHCR has provided health care services.353  
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In 2017, for the first time, the UNSMIL report officially confirmed the existence of slave markets and that 
women were being sold as sex slaves in Libya.354 It also explained in part, how the migrants were being 
intercepted by the LCG at sea and transferred back to these detention centres run by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.355 The team visited several of the state-run detention centres and confirmed that migrants 
were still being violated through acts of torture and various forms of sexual violence, including rape.356 
UN agencies continued to provide humanitarian relief to Libya, however, the agencies themselves were 
underfunded.357 They had requested donations of US$ 115 million but only secured US$ 49.2 million, 28 
per cent of what was needed.358 Regardless of the shortfalls, the UN agencies continued to provide urgent 
humanitarian relief and assistance, mostly through national counterparts.359 
As a result of the many reports provided for by UNSMIL, the international community became aware of 
the human rights violations taking place in Libya. 
 
ii. The Liability of the United Nations 
As the only mission in Libya, and on a limited mandate, UNSMIL could not accomplish more than 
publishing reports and investigating possible human rights violations. Nevertheless, the reports provided 
greater insight into the reality of the state of migrants in Libya.  
The UN, as a peacekeeping body, has the duty to ensure that international peace and security are 
maintained. In terms of the UN Charter, the UN must endeavour to prevent and remove any threats to 
peace, and this may be done by means of collective action.360 The UN has made concerted efforts to 
address the migrant crisis and slave trade by providing aid and other humanitarian support in Libya. 
Regardless, the human rights situation remains volatile. It is arguable though as to whether these efforts 
were adequate and the UN fulfilled its duties. For instance, the UN may be criticised for not directly 
intervening to confront the abuses occurring at detention centres or at sea.  
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It is clear that crimes against humanity are being committed in Libya and that the state is a party to these 
crimes. The UNSMIL is working on a limited mandate and is underfunded, rendering its efforts largely 
ineffective. The UN may intervene through the authority of the UNSC, however, this has not been done.361  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The EU has acted contrary to international norms and its own policies in multiple instances. It has diverged 
from its plans to protect migrants and has instead adopted strategies that compromise the safety of 
migrants. The EU has had a profoundly negative impact on the migrant crisis by violating the principle of 
non-refoulement to protect its borders. As a result, the EU is accountable under international law for failing 
to fulfil its duty to protect human rights.   
The UN, despite lack of resources, has provided more support to the crisis than all institutions that have 
been analysed in this thesis. Regardless, the UN is reliant on member state resources. The UN has 
undertaken to expand the mandate of UNSMIL in order to provide more humanitarian support. Unlike the 
other human rights bodies discussed, i.e. the AU and EU, UN has upheld its duty to protect and promote 
human rights through peacekeeping and transparent investigations in Libya. 
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CHAPTER V – FINAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
I. FINAL ANALYSIS  
This objective of this thesis was to determine, under international law, the liability of the Libyan 
government, the AU, EU and UN in the slave trade in Libya. The slave trade crisis in Libya has been 
extensively recorded and published by the UN Reports362 as well as Amnesty International.363 Through 
these fact-finding reports, that include testimonies, as well as incriminating videos, it is evident that the 
slave trade exists in Libya.  These international human rights organizations have published reports of 
torture, malnutrition, forced labour, unfair and prolonged detention and the slave trade.364 This paper 
examined the duties of the Libyan government as well as international and regional bodies to the victims 
of these human rights abuses.  
The crime of slavery constitutes a crime against humanity, according to the definition provided for by the 
Rome Statute.365 In terms of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, a state has a duty to protect its 
population from crimes against humanity.366 If a state fails to uphold this duty, the international 
community may intervene to protect the victims of crimes against humanity.367  
The Libyan government has failed to implement its duty under the Responsibility to Protect. The efforts 
of the government against the slave trade have been minimal. Although the government has cooperated 
with UN agencies,368 it has failed to adopt and implements substantial laws, policies or strategies to ensure 
that the slave trade in Libya is abolished. The Libyan government’s lack of commitment towards 
addressing the human rights violations in Libya, and the government’s complicity in these abuses, 
transfers the responsibility on the international community to protect the migrants in Libya. Not only is 
the government liable to international human rights organizations such as the UN, but it is also accountable 
to individual states for committing human rights abuses against their nationals. However, as Libya is not 
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a state party to the ICC, state claims against Libya may only be brought before the ICC by states who are 
members of the Court. 
The AU has taken initiative by collaborating with the UN to remove thousands of migrants from Libya, 
and also by deploying an envoy to Libya to investigate the human rights atrocities.369 However, the 
undertakings made by the AU to address the situation further have been redundant. The African 
Commission is yet to conduct investigations, for instance.370 The AU has also failed to seek assistance 
from member states and to take any further action to tackle the grim conditions in the detention centres.  
Although the EU was not directly involved with the Libyan slave trade, the manner in which they reacted 
to the migrant crisis left migrants in a vulnerable position and susceptible to abuse. The EU funded the 
LCG whilst aware of the abuses the LCG commits against migrants.371 They took direct steps to ensure 
migrants were returned to Libya by amending their migrant plan and banning NGOs from participating in 
sea rescues of migrants.372 From these actions, it doubtful that the EU is devoted to providing assistance 
to Libya to alleviate the crisis. The EU is evidently most concerned with safeguarding its borders from 
migrants. It is not the duty of the EU to assist in the slave trade crisis however, the European states are 
liable the collective expulsion of aliens, against their own policies and international law.  
With regards to the UN, although the UNSMIL’s mandate only provided for analysing and reporting on 
the human rights situation in Libya, these reports formed the basis of many investigations in Libya. 
Compared to the other bodies, the UN has taken a greater initiative in addressing the issues of abuse of 
migrants in Libya. The UNHCR and the IOM have provided humanitarian relief to the migrants for years. 
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They have physically investigated detention centres to monitored abuses consistently.373 Despite having 
an inadequate budget, they have stretched their resources to provide assistance.374  
In light of the above, it is clear that all bodies may be held liable for the atrocities taking place in Libya. 
As their involvement and responsibilities vary, so does the degree of their liability in each case. Overall, 
all bodies must adopt more efficient strategies to end the crisis in Libya. 
 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 
i. The Libyan Government 
One of the drawbacks in the fight against migrant abuses in Libya is the absence of national legislation 
that governs and protects migrants specifically. Understandably, it would not be in Libya’s interest to 
accommodate large numbers of purely economic migrants. On the other hand, there are many refugees 
and asylum seekers within the groups of people entering the country. These persons should be afforded a 
fair opportunity to apply for asylum and enjoy protection from persecution. It is recommended that Libya 
amend its laws, to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers are protected from automatic detention. Where 
a migrant is detained, the conditions of detention must be humane and in accordance with international 
standards. 
It is also recommended that the government permits the UNHCR to establish stations closer to the borders 
to enable them quicker access to migrants crossing the borders. This may accelerate the sifting process to 
determine persons who genuinely seek asylum to escape persecution amongst the migrants.  
Finally, in order to demonstrate good faith and regain the trust of the international community, it is 
recommended that the Attorney General’s Office publish a report or release a statement on the progress 
of the 205 arrest warrants that were ordered. Furthermore, more efficient checks and balances to are 
needed to expose the government officials that may be involved in the crimes being committed. Those 
that are reasonably suspected of being involved should be on probation until cleared by authorities after 
transparent investigations. 
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ii. The African Union 
It is recommended that the AU ensures that the investigations promised by the African Commission are 
conducted speedily. Thereafter, the Commission needs to act quickly to ensure the Libyan authorities are 
reprimanded and held accountable.  
The AU has been making strides to independently address issues in Africa to illustrate self-efficiency. It 
is recommended that they request assistance from member states. Member states may assist in terms of 
manpower, funding or volunteering to accommodate migrants from Libya. Through this collaboration, the 
AU may solve an African problem by African means as opposed to relying on aid from the West. The AU 
may approach the EU and UN for further assistance if these African efforts are exhausted.  
Due to the political instability in Libya, it would be advised that the AU join the UNSMIL to request the 
UNSC to extend the Mission’s mandate to a peacekeeping mission. As the AU is already currently 
cooperating with the IOM to rescue migrants from Libya, it is recommended that the AU seek more 
funding to help the IOM work quickly.  
Finally, as the AU, UN and EU are aiming to work together to prevent the high levels of death at sea, it is 
suggested that the AU request the EU to lift the ban on NGO rescue missions at sea. It is clear that the EU 
does not wish to shelter more migrants. Arrangements may be made to return rescued migrants to African 
territory. However, instead of migrants being returned to Libya, they must be returned to other ports.  
 
iii. The European Union  
It is recommended that the EU stop funding the LCG. There are numerous reports that have exposed the 
abusive tactics of the LCG. The EU must stop funding them to prevent these atrocities and demonstrate 
good faith. The EU may continue to carry out its missions at sea by donating more boats to monitor slave 
trade and work with relevant NGOs.  
Curtailing the work of the NGOs has increased the number of migrants dying at sea. The EU must lift the 
ban on NGOs to participate in rescue missions at sea. 
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iv. The United Nations  
It is recommended that the UNSC take collective action and expand its UNSMIL mission in Libya to a 
peacekeeping mission. It would further be beneficial for the UN to engage member states to donate more 
resources towards the eradication of the slave trade in Libya. 
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